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Preface
In many multi-user information systems, the users are organized as a hi­
erarchy. Each user is a subordinate, superior and/or coordinate of some 
others. In such systems, a user has access to the information if  and only 
if  the information belongs to the user or his/her subordinates. Hierarchical 
access control schemes are designed to enforce such access policy. In the past 
years, hierarchical access control schemes based on cryptography are inten­
sively researched. Much progress has been made in improving the schemes’ 
performance and security.
The main contribution of this thesis is a new hierarchical access control 
scheme. This is the first one that provides strict security proof under a 
comprehensive security model that covers all possible cryptographic attacks 
to a hierarchical access control scheme. The scheme is designed and ana­
lyzed based on the modern cryptography approach, i.e., defining the security 
model, constructing the scheme based on cryptography primitives, and prov­
ing the security of the scheme by reducing the cryptography primitives to 
the scheme. Besides the security property, this scheme also achieves good 
performance in consuming small storage space, supporting arbitrary and dy­
namic hierarchial structures. In the thesis, we also introduce the background 
in cryptography and review the previous schemes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 P rob lem  S ta tem en t
In a multi-user information system, the access permission to certain infor­
mation objects is usually only granted to certain users. To enforce the access 
policy, secret values for certain objects is assigned to the users with access 
privilege. The secret values may be the password used to authenticate the 
users for accessing to the objects, or the cryptographic key for the users to 
decrypt the encrypted data to recover the original information. In either 
case, the access control to the protected information relies on the secret val­
ues assigned to the users. For simplicity, we call the secret values a key, 
although it might be either a cryptographic key or a password.
In many situations, the organization of the users is a hierarchy. In the 
hierarchy, each user has his/her subordinates, superiors and/or coordinates. 
The access control policy in such an organization usually grants a user the 
access privileges of all his/her subordinates. We call such a policy hierarchical 
access control policy, and call the scheme that implements such a policy a 
hierarchical access control scheme. In the scheme, the group of users with 
the same access privileges is called a security class.
10
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
A hierarchical system can be represented as a partially ordered set (poset). 
In such a hierarchy, all users are allocated into a number of disjoint sets of 
security classes (or classes in short,) Q , Cg, - - - ,Cn- A binary relation < 
partially orders the set C =  {C i, Cg, • ■ • , C^,}. The users in Cj have access 
to the information held by users in Q  if  and only if  the relation C, <  Cj 
held in the poset (C, <). We denote Q  < Cj if  Q  < Cj and C, is not Cj. I f  
Ci < Cj, Ci is called a successor of Cj, and Cj is called a predecessor of Q. 
I f  Ci <  Cj and there is no such that Ci < Ck < Cj, then Q  is called an 
immediate successor of Cj, and Cj is called an immediate predecessor of Q. 
A class without any predecessor is called a root class. A class without any 
successor is called a leaf class. A class w ith both predecessors and successors 
is called an internal class. An example of the structure of a poset hierarchy 
is shown in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Fxample of the structure of a poset hierarchy
A straightforward access control scheme for poset hierarchy is to assign
11
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
each class w ith a key, and let a class have the keys of all its successors. 
The information belonging to a class is encrypted with the key assigned 
to that class, therefore the predecessors have access to the information of 
their successors. This is simple but awkward because the classes in higher 
hierarchy have to store a large number of keys. In the past two decades, 
many schemes based on cryptography have been proposed to ease the key 
management for poset hierarchy. Generally, these schemes are aimed to fully 
or partly achieve the following goals:
•  Support any arbitrary poset. I t  is desirable that any arbitrary poset is 
supported. Some schemes only support special cases of poset such as a 
tree. Such schemes are considered restrictive in application.
•  Be secure under attacks. The schemes are supposed to withstand at­
tacks. For example, a user may try  to derive the key of a class that is 
not his/her successor. The schemes should be secure under all possible 
attacks.
•  Require small storage space. Any scheme needs a user in a class to store 
a certain amount of secret or public parameters. A ll the schemes tried 
to reduce the amount of parameters stored.
•  Support dynamic poset structures. The structure of a hierarchy may 
change. Glasses may be added to or deleted from the hierarchy. In 
these cases the users in the classes (not only the ones added and deleted) 
need to update the parameters they store. I t  is desirable that when 
a change takes place, the number of classes involved in updating their 
parameters is as small as possible.
Regarding the security of the schemes, it  is important to define how to 
evaluate whether the schemes are secure. In many of the previous schemes, 
a list of attacking scenarios are given. However, we can easily give more
12
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attacking scenarios. Other than elaborating a list of attacks which may still 
be incomplete, we prefer to a security definition that can cover any attacks 
that are possible to the scheme. We come up with the following security 
model:
D e fin itio n  1.1 A hierarchical access control scheme fo r poset hierarchy is 
secure i f  fo r any group of classes in the poset, i t  is infeasible to derive the 
key of any class that is not a member of that group, nor a successor of any 
member of that group.
This model covers any attacks presented in previous schemes. W ithin this 
model, only the legitimate predecessors of a class have access to this class. 
A ll other users, no matter how they conspire, are not able to access this class.
1.2 C on tr ib u tion  o f  T h is T h esis
In the past years a lot of hierarchical access control schemes have been pro­
posed. They made a great progress in improving the performance and se­
curity. However, as we w ill review in details in the next chapter, although 
some schemes achieve good performance in supporting arbitrary poset, small 
storage and dynamic structures, none of them have thoroughly proved to be 
secure under the security model in Definition 1.1.
In this thesis, we propose a new scheme that is superior to the previous 
schemes in that it  provides both good performance and provable security. 
Our scheme supports arbitrary poset, has similar performance in storage 
and dynamics achieved by other schemes. The most significant part of our 
scheme is its formal security proof under Definition 1.1, which the previous 
schemes did not provide.
13
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1.3 O utlin e o f  th is  th esis
The rests of the thesis are organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we introduce 
the cryptographic background, including the definitions, concepts and nota­
tions, which is necessary for us to present and analyze the previous schemes 
as well as ours. In Chapter 3 we review the previous schemes, showing the 
progress, direction and open problems in this topic. In Chapter 4 we present 
our scheme and its security proof. Chapter 5 summarizes the schemes.
14
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Chapter 2 
Cryptography Background
In this chapter we introduce the cryptographic background based on which 
schemes are designed and analyzed. It  includes the definitions, notes and 
algorithms in mathematics (number theory, abstract algebra and finite field); 
basic cryptographic primitives, cryptography scheme design methodologies. 
We only include what are necessary for the following chapters. For extensive 
contents of the background, please refer to [2], [8] and [15].
2.1 M a th em a tics  B ackground
In tegers m od N
Let Z denote the set of integers, Z+ denote the set of positive integers.
I f  a, b are integers, not both zero, then their greatest common divisor, 
denoted gcd(a,6), is the largest integer d such that d divides a (denoted as 
d|u) and d divides b {d\b). I f  gcd(a,6) =  1 then we say that a and b are 
relatively prime. I f  a, N  are integers w ith N  > 0 then there are unique 
integers r, q such that a =  Nq +  r  and 0 <  r  < N. We call r  the remainder 
upon division of a by N, and denote it by a mod N. I f  a, b are any integers
15
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and N  is a positive integer, we write
a =  b mod N
if  a mod N  =  b mod N. We associate to any positive integer N  the follow­
ing two sets:
Tjn =  {0,1, • • • ,N  — 1}
Z*pf =  { i  e Z ■. 1 < i  < N  — 1 and gcd(i, N )  =  1}
The first set is called the set of integers mod N. Its size is N, and it  contains 
exactly the integers that are possible values of a mod N  as a ranges over Z. 
We define the Euler Phi (or totient) function 4>{N) =  |Z^| for all N  G Z+. 
That is, 0 (N ) is the size of Z*pj.
Group
Let G be a non-empty set and let ■ denote a binary operation on G. We say 
that G is a group if  it has the following properties:
1. Closure: For every a, 6 G G it is the case that a • 6 is also in G.
2. Associativity: For every a, 6, c G G it is the case that (a• 6) • c =  a-{b-c).
3. Identity: There exists an element 1 G G such that a ■ 1 =  1 • a =  a for 
all Q G G.
4. Invertibility: For every a G G there exists a unique 6 G G such that 
a ■ b =  b ■ a =  1 .
The element b in the invertibility condition is referred to as the inverse 
of the element a, and is denoted
A group G is abelian (or commutative) if  a ■ 5 =  6 • a for all a, 6 G G.
Let N  be a positive integer. The operation of addition modulo N  takes 
input any two integers a, b and returns (a +  b) mod N. The operation of
16
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multiplication modulo N  takes input any two integers a, b and returns ab 
mod N. Then Zjv is a group under addition modulo N, and is a group 
under multiplication modulo N.
In Zat, the identity element is 0 and the inverse of a is —a mod N  =  
N  — a. In Z ^ , the identity element is 1 and the inverse of a is a 6 e Z ^  such 
that =  1( mod N).
In any group, we can define an exponentiation operation which associates 
to any a G G and any integer i a group element we denote a \  defined as 
follows. I f  i =  0 then a* is defined to be 1, the identity element of the group. 
I f  z >  0 then
a* =  a g - g .
i
I f  i  is negative, then we define a* =
W ith these definition in place, we can manipulate exponents in the way 
in which we are accustomed with ordinary numbers. Namely, identities such 
as the following hold for all a G G and all i , j  G Z:
0'+:' = o ' . o:"
=  0'^
a "* =
= ( a - i ) '
The size of a group G is called its order, denoted |G|. It  is the number of 
elements in the group. We w ill often make use of the following basic fact. It  
says that if  any group element is raised to the power the order of the group, 
the result is the identity element of the group.
Let G be a group and let m =  |G| be its order. Then a™ =  1 for all 
CL G G.
This means that computation in the group indices can be done modulo
m:
17
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Let G be a group and let m =  |G| be its order. Then a® =  a® ™ for 
all a e G and all z e Z.
Exam ple 2.1 Let us work in the group under the operation of multipli­
cation modulo 21. The members of this group are 1, 2, f ,  5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 
16, 17, 19, 20, so the order of the group is m =  12. Suppose we want to 
compute 5®® in this group. Applying the above we have
5̂  ̂ mod 21 =  5̂  ̂ mod 21 =  5̂  mod 21 =  4.
□
I f  G is a group, a set S Ç G is called a subgroup if  i t  is a group in its 
own right, under the same operation as that under which G is a group. I f  we 
already know that G is a group, there is a simple way to test whether S is a 
subgroup; it is one if  and only if  x ■ y~^ G § for all x,y  E S. Here y~^ is the 
inverse of y in G .
Let G be a group and let § be a subgroup of G. Then the order of S 
divides the order of C.
Cyclic groups and generators
Let G be a group, let 1 denote its identity element, and let m =  |G| be the 
order of G. I f  y G G is any member of the group, the order of g is defined to 
be the least positive integer n such that y”  =  1. We let
<  P > =  {g ' : % G Z;,} =  { / ,  y \  - - ,
denote the set of group elements generated by y. A fact is that this set is a 
subgroup of G. The order of this subgroup is the order of y, thus the order 
n of y divides the order m of the group. An element y of the group is called 
a generator of G if  < y > =  G, or, equivalently, if  its order is m. I f  y is a
18
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generator of G then for every a G G there is a unique integer i G such that 
y® =  a. This i is called the discrete logarithm of a to base g, and we denote 
it by DLogQ^g(a). Therefore, DLogQ^g{a) is a function that maps G to Z^, 
and moreover this function is a bijection. The function of Z ^  to G defined 
by % ^  y' is called the discrete exponentiation function, and the discrete 
logarithm function is the inverse of the discrete exponentiation function.
Here we give an example. Let y =  11, which is a prime. Then Z^^ =  
{1 ,2 ,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10} has order y — 1 — 10. Let us find the subgroups 
generated by group elements 2 and 5. We raise them to the powers i  =  
0, • • • ,9. We get:
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2® mod 11 1 2 4 8 5 10 9 7 3 6
5® mod 11 1 5 3 4 9 1 5 3 4 9
Looking at which elements appear in the row corresponding to 2 and 5, 
respectively, we can determine the subgroups these group elements generate:
(2) =  {1 ,2 ,3 ,4,5,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 ,10}
(5) = {1,3,4,5,9}
Since (2) equals to Z{^, the element 2 is a generator. Since a generator exists, 
Z*i is cyclic. On the other hand, (5) A  so 5 is not a generator of Z*^. 
The order of 2 is 10, while the order of 5 is 5. Note that these orders divide 
10, the order of the group. The table also enables us to determine the discrete 
logarithms to base 2 of the different group elements:
a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
E/oyz«^,2(a) 0 1 8 2 4 9 7 3 6 5
The discrete exponentiation function is conjectured to be one-way (mean­
ing the discrete logarithm function is hard to compute) for some cyclic groups
19
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G. Due to this fact we often seek cyclic groups for cryptographic usage. Here 
are two example sources of such groups;
•  Let y be a prime. Then the group Z* is cyclic.
The operation here is multiplication modulo y, and the size of this 
group is (/>(y) =  y — 1. This is the most common choice of group in 
cryptography.
•  Let G be a group and let m =  |G| be its order. I f  m is a prime number, 
then G is cyclic. In other words, any group having a prime number of 
elements is cyclic.
Another source of cyclic group is from finite field, which is defined later. 
Groups of prim e order
A group of prime order is a group G whose order m =  |G| is a prime number. 
Such a group is always cyclic. These groups turn out to be quite useful in 
cryptography, so let us take a brief look at them and some of their properties.
An element h of a group G is called non-trivial if  it  is not equal to the 
identity element of the group.
Suppose G is a group of order q where g is a prime, and h is any non-trivial 
member of G. Then h is a generator of G.
A common way to obtain a group of prime order for cryptographic schemes 
is as a subgroup of a group of integers modulo a prime. We pick a prime y 
having the property that q =  (y ~ l) /2  is also prime. I t  turns out that the 
subgroup of quadratic residues modulo y then has order q, and hence is a 
group of prime order.
Let us now explain what we perceive to be the advantage conferred by 
working in a group of prime order. Let G be a cyclic group, and g a generator. 
We know that the discrete logarithms to base g range in the set Zm where
20
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m =  |G| is the order of G. This means that arithmetic in these exponents 
is modulo m. I f  G has prime order, then m is prime. This means that any 
non-zero exponent has a multiplicative inverse modulo m. In other words, 
in working in the exponents, we can divide. I t  is this that turns out to be 
useful.
Ring
A ring (M, -f, •) consists of a set R with two binary operations arbitrarily 
denoted 4- (addition) and • (multiplication) on M, satisfying the following 
axioms.
•  (M, -f) is an abelian group w ith an identity denoted 0.
•  The operation • is associative. That is, a ■ {b ■ c) =  {a ■ b) ■ c) for all 
a, 6, c e R
• There is a multiplicative identity denoted 1, w ith 1 ^ 0 ,  such that
1 ■ a =  a ■ 1 =  a for all a G R.
•  The operation ■ is distributive over +. That is, a-{b+c) =  {a-b)-\-{a-c) 
and (6 +  c) - a =  (6 - o) +  (c - o) for all a, 6, c G R.
The ring is a commutative ring if  a ■ 6 =  6 ■ a for all a, 5 G R.
For example, the set Z „ with addition and multiplication perforrned mod­
ulo u is a commutative ring.
Field
A field is a commutative ring in which all non-zero elements have multiplica­
tive inverses.
For example Z „ is a field (under the usual operations of addition and 
multiplication modulo n) if  and only if  n is a prime number.
21
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Polynom ial rings
I f  M is a commutative ring, then a polynomial in the indeterminate x over 
the ring R is an expression of the form
/ ( x )  =  a„x" H +  0 2 +  oix +  oo
where each Oj € R and n > 0. The element Oj is called the coefficient of Xj 
in /(x ) . The largest integer m for which a™ ^  0 is called the degree of /(x ) , 
denoted deg /(x ) .
Division algorithm for polynomials is defined as follows if  g{x),h{x) e 
F[x], w ith h(x) A 0, then ordinary polynomial long division of g{x) by h[x) 
yields polynomials q{x) and r(x ) E F[x] such that g{x) =  q{x)h{x) + r (x ) ,  
where deg r{x) < deg h{x). Moreover, g(x) and r(x ) are unique. The 
polynomial q{x) is called the quotient, while r(x ) is called the remainder. 
The remainder of the division is sometimes denoted g{x) mod h{x), and the 
quotient is sometimes denoted g{x) div h{x).
I f  g{x),h{x) G F[x] then h{x) divides g(x), written h{x)\g{x), if  g{x) 
mod h{x) =  0.
I f  g[x),h{x) G F[x], then g{x) is said to be congruent to h{x) modulo 
/(x )  if  / (x )  divides g{x) — h{x). This is denoted by
g{x) =  h{x) mod /(x )
Let / (x )  be a fixed polynomial in F[x]. The equivalence class of a poly­
nomial g{x) G F[x] is the set of all polynomials in F[x] congruent to g{x) 
modulo /(x ).
F [x ]/( /(x ))  denotes the set of (equivalence classes of) polynomials in F[x] 
of degree less than n =  deg f{x ) .
I f  R is a commutative ring, the polynomial ring R[x] is the ring formed by 
the set of all polynomials in the indeterminate x having coefficients from R.
22
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The two operations are the standard polynomial addition and multiplication, 
w ith coefficient arithmetic performed in the ring R.
Let f ( x )  G F[x] be a polynomial of degree at least 1. Then / (x )  is said to 
be irreducible over F if  it  cannot be written as the product of two polynomials 
in F[x], each of positive degree.
I f  / ( x )  is irreducible over F, then F [x ]/( /(x ))  is a field.
F in ite  F ie ld
A finite field is a field F which contains a finite number of elements. The 
order of F is the number of elements in F.
Facts about finite field:
•  I f  F is a finite field, then F contains p"® elements for some prime p and 
integer m >  1.
•  For every prime power order p”®, there is a unique finite field of order 
p™. This field is denoted by Fpm, or sometimes by GF(p"®).
An irreducible polynomial / ( x )  G Zp[x] of degree m is called a primitive 
polynomial i f  x is a generator of F*m, the multiplicative group of all the 
non-zero elements in Fpm =  Z p [x ]/(/(x )).
Exam ple 2.2 Example of a finite field F24 of order 16: R can he verified 
that the polynomial f {x )  =  x'̂  4- x 4- 1 is irreducible over Z 2 . Hence the finite 
f ie ld¥ 2 ‘i can be represented as the set of all polynomials over ¥ 2  of degree less 
than 4- That is,
F24 =  {ugX^ 4“ a2 x'  ̂4- QjX 4 - Uo|®i G {0, !} } •
For convenience, the polynomial a^x^ 4- 02 X̂  4- a\x 4- Oq can be represented by 
the vector (usagOiOo) of length 4, and
F24 =  {(03020100)|0i G { 0, 1}}.
23
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□
The following are some examples of field arithmetic.
•  Field elements are simply added componentwise; for example,
(1011) +  (1001) -  (0010).
•  To multiply the held elements (1101) and (1001), multiply them as
polynomials and then take the remainder when this product is divided
b y f^ ^ :
(x^ +  +  1 ) - (z^ +  1 ) =  +  x^ +  x “̂ +  1
=  x^+x'^ +  x +  l  mod f{x ) .
Hence (1101)•(1001) =  (1111)
• The multiplicative identity of Fg4 is (0001).
• The inverse of (1011) is (0101). To verify this, observe that
(x^ +  a: +  1) • (x^ +  1) =  x^ +  x^ +  x + 1
=  1 mod /(x ),
whence (1011) • (0101) =  (0001).
/ (x )  is a primitive polynomial, or, equivalently, the held element x =  (0010) 
is a generator of Fg4 . This may be checked by verifying that all the non-zero 
elements in Fg4 can be obtained as a powers of x. The computations are 
summarized in Table 2.1.
24
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Table 2.1: The powers of x modulo /(x )  =  x"̂  +  x +  1.
i x' mod x"^ +  X  +  1 vector notation
0 1 (0001)
1 X (0010)
2 x ^ (0100)
3 x ^ (1000)
4 X  +  1 (0011)
5 (0110)
6 x^ +  x% (1100)
7 X ^ +  X  +  1 (1011)
8 x ^  +  1 (0101)
9 x^ +  x (1010)
10 X ^ +  X  +  1 (0111)
11 x^ +  x^ +  x (1110)
12 X® +  X ^  +  X  +  1 (1111)
13 x ^  +  x ^  +  1 (1101)
14 x ^  +  1 (1001)
25
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Table 2.2; B it complexity of basic operations in Z„.
Operation B it Cornplexity
Modular Addition (a +  b) mod n 
Modular subtraction (a — b) mod n 
Modular multiplication (a • b) mod n 
Modular inversion a~^ mod n 






2.2 C o m p lex ity  o f  A lgorith m s
The numbers arising in cryptographic algorithms are large, having magni­
tudes like 2^12 or The arithmetic operations on these numbers are the 
main cost of the algorithm, and the costs grow as the numbers get bigger.
The numbers are provided to the algorithm in binary, and the size of 
the input number is thus the number of bits in its binary representation. 
We call this the length, or binary length, of the number, and we measure 
the running time of the algorithm as a function of the binary lengths of its 
input numbers. In computing the running time, we count the number of b it 
operations performed.
Table 2.2 summarizes the b it complexity of basic operations in Z„.
Table 2.3 summarizes the complexity of basic operations in Fpm. In the 
table, “operations in Zp” means either an addition, subtraction, multiplica­
tion, inversion, or division in Zp.
A ll these operations can be finished within polynomial (in the number of 
the bits of the inputs) steps.
26
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Table 2.3: Complexity of basic operations in Fp









2.3 In tractab le  C om p u ta tion a l P rob lem s
In modern cryptography, the security of the cryptographic schemes relies 
on the intractability of the computational problems. These problems are 
believed to be intractable, although no proof is known. We present some of 
them that are used in the schemes we w ill review and present below. We 
take the notations mainly from [2]. For an introduction to the problems in 
more plain English, please refer to [15].
Note all the operations in the following problems are modular operations 
on corresponding groups. For simplicity we omit the modular expression. 
For example, we write a +  b instead oî a +  b mod N  i f  we have indicated 
that the operation is on the group Zjv-
2.3.1 Discrete Logarithm  Problem
As we have seen, on the cyclic group the discrete exponentiation function 
can be computed by a polynomial algorithm. Its inversion, the Discrete 
Logarithm Problem (DLP) is defined as the following: given a finite cyclic 
group G of order n, a generator of G, and an element /3 G G, find the 
integer x G [l,n ], such that =  j3. The DLP is believed to be hard. Next
27
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we give a quantitative description about the hardness.
Let A  be an probabilistic polynomial algorithm that inverts the exponen­
tiation function. Let x X  denotes the operation of selecting an element 
X uniformly from some set X at random. We consider the experiment in 
Experiment 1.
X
x ' ^  ^ (% )





Experim ent 1: Experiment ExpQg(A)
In this experiment, we anticipated there is some probability that the 
return value is 1 , i.e., A  has some probability that output an x' such that 
gx' _  gx df-advantage of A  is defined as
The dehnition above measures how good an algorithm is at solving the 
discrete logarithm problem.
The discrete logarithm problem is believed to be intractable. Formally 
speaking, let I be the bit-length of the order of the group G, for any polyno­
mial time (in I) algorithm A  and any polynomial P{-), for sufficiently large
Adug,,(.A) = Pr[Expg,,(,A) = 1] <
28
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2.3.2 The R S A  problem
The RSA problem is defined as follows: given a positive integer n that is a 
product of two distinct odd primes p and q, a positive integer e such that 
gcd{e, 4>{n)) =  gcd(e, {p — l)(g  — 1)) =  1 , and an integer c, find an integer 
m G Zn such that r r f  — c.
Let A  be a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that solves the RSA 
problem. Let G =  Z„. We consider the experiment in Experiment 2.
x ' ^  A (X )





Experim ent 2: Experiment Exp^^Y^{A)
The RSA-advantage of A  is defined as
=  P r[Expg^^(A ) =  1]
Like the discrete logarithm problem, the RSA problem is believed to be 
intractable: let I be the bit-length of the order of the group G, for any A  
and any polynomial P(-), for sufficiently large /,
A d vg P iA )  =  P r lE x p iJ A )  =  1] <  p | iy
2.3.3 Decisional D iffie-H ellm an Problem
The DDK problem is to distinguish the two distributions {g, and
{g, g^,g^,g^), where g is the generator of a finite cyclic group G of order m; x,
29
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y, z are random variables uniformly distributed on In another word,
given DDH problem is to distinguish g^  ̂ from a random variable
uniformly distributed on G.
The formalization considers a “two worlds” setting. The adversary gets 
input X, Y, Z. In either world, X, Y  are random group elements, but the 
manner in which Z  is chosen depends on the world. In World 1 ,2  =  
where x =  DLogQ^g{X) and y =  DLogQ^g{Y). In World 0, Z  is chosen at 
random from the group, independently o( X ,Y  . The adversary must decide 
in which world it  is.
Let G be a cyclic group of order m, let A  be a distinguisher, an proba­
bilistic polynomial algorithm that returns one bit, 0 or 1 , depending on which 
world A  thinks it  is in. We consider the experiments in Experiment 3;
Experiment Exp^^^ ^(A) Experiment Exp^^  °(A)
z xg
% 4 -g ^ ;y  ^ g l / ; 2 4 - g ^
return A {X , Y, Z) return A{X, Y, Z)
E xperim en t 3: DDH experiments
The ddh-advantage of A  is defined as
Advi^^ iA )  =  \ P lE x p ÿ p \ A ) \  -  P [ E x p i f p \ A ) ] \
The definition above measures how good A  can distinguish the two world. 
The DDH problem is believed to be intractable on some cyclic group, i.e., 
let I be the bit-length of the order of such a group G, for any A  and any 
polynomial P(-), for sufficiently large /,
A i v t i i A )  < Y f y  
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Note DDH is not intractable in every cyclic group. Most groups in which 
DDH is believed to be intractable have prime order. In [3] a list of such 
groups are given. Here we just present one that w ill be used in our scheme: 
Let p =  2g +  1 where both p  and q are prime. Let Qp be the subgroup 
of order q of Z*. Qp is a cyclic group of prime order on which DDH is 
intractable.
2.4 C ryp tograp h ic  P rim itiv es
2,4.1 One-way function
A one-way function is a function which is easy to compute but hard to invert. 
Here we give our formal definition.
D efinition 2.3 Let m ,n  be polynomials. Let I be an integer parameter, V  =  
U;{0, a n d  7Z =  the function  f  \ V  ^  TZ is a one-way
function  i f  the two conditions hold:
1. easy to compute. On input x  e { 0 , / ( x)  can be computed in  
polynom ial tim e (in  I), and
2. hard to invert. For any probabilistic polynom ial-tim e (in  I )  algorithm  
A , any polynom ial P {-), and a ll suffic iently large I, on input x  G 
( 0,
A [A (/((x)) =  x] < ^
where f i  denotes the restriction o f f  on {0,1}"^®.
For example, on the cyclic group G, the exponentiation function is one-way 
because it  is easy to compute, but hard to invert. Its inversion DLP is 
intractable.
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2.4.2 One-way hash function
One-way hash function h : V  7Z,V =  {0,1}™® (7Z =  {0,1}^®, >
n ( l) , m ( - ) , n(-) are polynomials) is an one-way function with pre-image resis­
tance and 2nd pre-image resistance properties;
1 . pre-image resistance; given x G D, it  is infeasible to find x' such that 
x' 7  ̂X and h (x ') — h(x).
2. 2 nd pre-image resistance: it is infeasible to find a pair of x  f  x' such 
that h (x ') = h{x).
2.4.3 Universal one-way hash function fam ily
Universal one-way hash function families are first proposed in [13]. Then [17] 
extended the work. A generalization of the universal one-way hash function 
family is proposed in [23] (called sibling intractable function family SIFF), 
which is used to solve the hierarchical access control problem. Here we give 
the definition and construction of the universal one-way hash function family.
Definition 2.4 Let m, n  he polynomials. Let I be an integer parameter, V  =  
1J;{0,1 }™® and TZ =  |J ;{0 ,1}"®, the functions { f \ f  : V  -a  JZ] is a fam ily  o f 
universal one-way hash functions i f  fo r  a ll probabilistic polynom ial algorithm  
A  the fo llow ing holds fo r  sufficiently large I:
1. On input x G { 0 ,1 } ™ ® , Pr[A{f,x) =  x ', / (x )  =  / (x ') ,x ' A  x] <  
where the probability is taken over a ll f  G {/;} and the random choices 
of A.
2. f i  is computable in  polynom ial tim e ( i n i ) .
3. f i  is accessible: there exists an algorithm  G such that Q on input I 
generates un ifo rm ly  at random a description o f f  G f i.
( f i denotes the restriction  o f f  on {0,1}™®.}
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Exam ple 2.5 A n example o f universal one-way hash function  is constructed 
below.
1. On the fin ite  fie ld  Fgi, { //}  =  {fa,b\fo.,b{^) =  chop{ax +  h),a,h G ¥ 2 1 }  
where a ll computation are in  F̂ ; and chop: {0,1}' 1—> {0,1}'^^ chops 
the last bit.
2. Let g be an one-way perm utation. Define H i =  {h  =  f  o g \ f  G {/;}}• 
Then [ j f H i )  is a universal one-way hash function . □
The universal one-way hash function has the following Collision Accessibility 
property: Given x f  x' G {0,1}™®, it is easy to find h G hi such that 
h{x) =  h{x'). Note that by the definition of the universal one-way hash 
function family, given the x and h, it is intractable to find the x' f  x such 
that h{x') =  h{x).
2.4.4 Pseudo-Random  function
The pseudo-random function family was proposed by Goldreich, Goldwasser 
and Micali in [9]. In such a family, each function is specified by a short, 
random key, and can be easily computed given the key. But without the key, 
given an input, the output of the function looks like a random number. Next 
we give a formal description.
A function family is a map 2F : K, x D ^  TZ. Here K, is the set of keys of 
T  and V  is the domain of H  and TZ is the range of P. The set of keys and 
the range are finite, and all of the sets are nonempty. The two-input function 
P  takes a key K  and an input X  to return a point Y  we denote by P {K , X).  
For any key R  G AC we define the map Fk ■ V  TZ hy F k {X )  =  P {K ,Y ) .  
We call the function E^  an instance of function family P. Thus P  specifies 
a collection of maps, one for each key.
33
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Let F u n c {V , TZ) denote the family of all functions of V  to TZ. Suppose 
D =  {0 ,1 }', TZ =  {0 ,1}^, then the size of the key space of Func{V ,TZ) is 
2^^'. There is a key for every function of Lbits to L  bits, and this is the 
number of such functions.
A random function g : V  TZ is an instance uniformly picked from 
FuncÇD, TZ) at random, and put in a black-box. This means that one can 
give any value X ,  and get back g {X) .  But one cannot get the description of 
the instance g. The dynamic view of a random function can be thought of 
as implemented by the following computer program. The program maintains 
the function in the form of a table T  where T [ X ]  holds the value of the 
function at X .  Initially, the table is empty. The program processes an input 
X  e V  as follows:




The answer on any point is random and independent of the answers on other 
points.
A pseudo-random function is a family of functions, which is a subset of 
the random function family F unc{V ,T Z ), with the property that the input- 
output behavior of a random instance of this family is “computationally 
indistinguishable” from that of a random function.
We fix a family of functions P  : K- x V  TZ, and assume a two-world 
setting:
World 0: The function g is drawn at random from Func{V ,TZ ).
World 1: The function g is drawn at random from P . Note W is a subset 
of F u nc{V , TZ).
Let A  be an algorithm that takes an oracle from a function g : V  ^  TZ, 
to return a bit, 0  or 1 , to indicate which family of function the adversary
34
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thinks the g is from. We consider the experiments in Experiment 4.
Experiment ^(A) Experiment ExpTf^ °(A)
g4^Pï:MC(P,%)
A  queries g A  queries g
A  outputs 6 A  outputs b
return b return b
E xperim en t 4: Experiments for pseudo-random function distinguisher 
The prf-advantage of A  is defined as
Adup-^(A) =  |P [E xp^^-°(A ) =  1] -  P [E x p ^ ^ - \A )  =  1]|
The definition above measures how good A  can distinguish the two world. 
I f  for any polynomial time algorithm A, its pr/-advantage is negligible, 
then the function family W ; / C x P - ^ R i s a  pseudo-random function family.
The block ciphers such as DES and AES, are modeled as pseudo-random 
functions (or permutations). That is, let I be the block size, for any poly­
nomial time algorithm A, any polynomial P, for sufficiently large I, there 
is
Adv^gA) <
The DDH problem we introduced above is also believed to be a pseudo­
random function family.
2.5 C ryp tograp h ic  S ch em e S ecu rity
In this section, we introduce the cryptographic protocol design approaches. 
After reviewing the Cryptanalysis-driven design. Shannon Security, we will 
focus on provable security which is used in our design. For more details, 
please refer to [2 ], [8 ].
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2.5.1 Cryptanalysis-driven design
Traditionally, cryptographic protocols have been designed by focusing on 
concrete attacks and how to defeat them. The approach works like this;
1. A  cryptographic goal is recognized.
2 . A  solution is offered.
3. One searches for an attack on the proposed solution.
4. When one feasible attack is found, go back to Step 2 and try  to come 
up with a better solution. The process then continues.
Step 3 is called cryptanalysis. In the classical approach to design cryp­
tographic scheme, cryptanalysis was an essential component of constructing 
any new design.
There are some difficulties w ith the approach of cryptanalysis-drive de­
sign. The obvious problem is that one never knows if  things are right. The 
process should iterate until one feels “confident” that the solution is ade­
quate. But one has to accept that design errors might come to light at any 
time.
2.5.2 Shannon Security
A “systematic” approach to cryptography, where proofs and definitions play 
a visible role, begins in the work of Claude Shannon[19], which measures 
the secrecy of the information with information theory concepts. We briefly 
present the idea of Shannon as follows. Let R : {0 ,1 }”  —> [0,1] be a probabil­
ity  distribution on the set of n-bit plaintexts. That is, assume Alice chooses 
a plaintext m to send with probability P[m\. This distribution is known to 
everyone, including the adversary. Thus, before the ciphertext c is transmit­
ted, all the adversary knows is that any particular message m has probability
36
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P[m] of being transmitted. Shannon security requires that, the conditional 
probability that after observing the ciphertext c, to the adversary, the prob­
ability that the message is m keeps P[m\. That is f  [m|c] =  P[m\. I t  means 
that the adversary does not get any information about the plaintext from its 
ciphertext.
An example of such a scheme, one-time pad, is Shannon-secure. The 
one-time pad is as follows. Alice and Bob share a random secret key of n 
bits, K  =  kik^ ■■ - kn- Alice want to send Bob a message M , also n bits, 
M  =  777-17712 • rrin. The ciphertext C  is the bit-wise XOR of the plaintext
and key:
C =  M  K  =  C1C2
where
Cl =  k \  r r i i ,  Cg =  fcg m 2 ,  • • • ,Cn =  kn  m ^ .
After receiving the ciphertext. Bob can recover the plaintext w ith the key:
M  =  C K  =  77717772
where
' Tflri
rrii =  /Ci ^  Cl, 7772 =  /C2 ^  C2, • • • , r77„ =  ^  C„.
In the one-time pad encryption, the adversary does not get any information 
about M  from C.
Shannon-security however has important limitations. To achieve Shannon 
security, the key has to be as long as the message. I f  an encryption scheme is 
to meet Shannon security, the number of key bits must be at least the total 
number of plaintext bits we’re going to encrypt.
This fact has some fundamental implications. I f  we want to do practical 
cryptography, we must be able to use a single short key to encrypt lots of 
bits. This means that we w ill not be able to achieve Shannon security. A 
different paradigm and a different notion of security have to be taken.
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2.5.3 Provable Security
The modern cryptography introduces a new dimension: the amount of com­
puting power available to an adversary. I t  seeks to have security as long as 
adversaries do not have “too much” computing time. Schemes are breakable 
i f  the adversary has infinite computing power, but in practice, the attacks 
are infeasible.
For the security of a scheme, we w ill want to be making statements like 
this: Assuming the adversary uses no more than t  computing cycles, her 
probability of breaking the scheme is at most t  =  2“ ^°°. Notice we do not 
assume how the adversary operates, what algorithm, or technique the adver­
sary uses.
The legitimate parties must be able to efficiently execute the scheme in­
structions. Their effort should be reasonable. But the task for the adversary 
must be infeasible.
C ryptographic prim itives
The computational nature of modern cryptography means that one must 
find computationally hard problems, and base the cryptography schemes on 
them. The basic problems are called cryptographic primitives. They have 
some “hardness” or “security” properties, but by themselves they do not solve 
any problem of interest. They must be properly used as building blocks to 
achieve some useful scheme.
Cryptographic primitives are drawn from two sources: engineered con­
structs and mathematical problems. In the first class fall standard block 
ciphers such as the well-known AES algorithm. In the second class falls the 
DLP, RSA and DDH problems we have introduced above.
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The provable-security approach
From the cryptographic primitives, we start to transform them into schemes 
to solve the practical problems. We w ill view a cryptographer as an engine 
for turning the primitives into schemes. That is, we focus on scheme design 
under the assumption that good primitives exist.
A poorly designed scheme can be insecure even though the underlying 
primitive is good. The fault is not of the underlying primitive, but that 
primitive was somehow misused.
In practice, lots of application schemes have been broken, yet the good 
primitives, like AES and RSA, have never been convincingly broken. We 
would like to build on the strength of such primitives in such a way that 
schemes can “inherit” this strength, not lose it. The provable-security paradigm 
lets us do that.
The provable-security paradigm is as follows. Take some goal, like achiev­
ing privacy via symmetric encryption. The first step is to make a formal 
adversarial model and define what it  means for an encryption scheme to be 
secure. The definition explains exactly when the adversary is successful.
W ith a definition in hand, a particular scheme, based on some particular 
primitive, can be put forward. I t  is then analyzed from the point of view 
of meeting the definition. The plan is now show security via a reduction.
A reduction shows that the only way to defeat the scheme is to break the 
underlying primitive.
A reduction is a proof that if  the cryptographic primitive does the job it 
is supposed to do, then the scheme we have made does the job that it  is sup­
posed to do. Believing this, it is no longer necessary to directly cryptanalyze 
the scheme. I f  one found a weakness in the scheme, one would have found 
the weakness in the underlying primitive. And if  we believe the primitive 
is secure, then without further cryptanalysis of the scheme, we believe the 
scheme is secure too.
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In order to do a reduction one must have a formal notion of what is meant 
by the security of the underlying cryptographic primitive: what attacks, 
exactly, does it  withstand? For example, we might assume that discrete 
exponentiation function is a one-way function and can not be inverted.
Here is another way of looking at what reductions do. When a reduction 
from the onewayness of discrete exponentiation function to the security of 
the scheme, it is actually giving a transformation with the following property. 
Suppose the adversary A  is able to break the scheme. The transformation 
takes A  and turns it into another adversary that breaks discrete logarithm 
problem. Thus we conclude, as long as we believe no adversary cannot break 
DLP, there could be no such adversary A  that breaks the scheme. In other 
words, the scheme is secure.
The concept of using reductions in cryptography is a beautiful and pow­
erful idea. Schemes designed in this way have superior security guarantees. 
Yet we need to notice that in some ways the term “provable security” is 
misleading. As the above indicates, what is probably the central step is pro­
viding a model and definition of security. The reduction proves the scheme 
is secure under the security model. Whether the scheme is secure in practice 
depends on whether the model is defined reasonably.
The scheme we provide in chapter 4 takes the provable-security approach.
40
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Chapter 3
Related Works
In this chapter we review a number of previous schemes, trying to show a 
trace of efforts, progresses and directions in hierarchical access control. This 
is not a comprehensive list of all works, but to the best of our knowledge, 
these schemes present distinct ideas in solving the problems, and are typical 
among similar schemes.
A ll these schemes consist of two procedures. One is the key assignment. In 
this procedure a Central Authority (CA) assigns the secret keys and related 
public parameters to classes. The other is the key derivation. I t  is a procedure 
that a class derives the keys of its successors.
These schemes are categorized into 2 groups. One group is called direct 
access schemes because in these schemes, a predecessor can compute the key 
of any successor w ithout knowing the parameters of other successors between 
them. The other group is called indirect access schemes because in order to 
compute the key of a successor, a predecessor has to compute the keys of the 
successors between them.
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3.1 S om e D irect A ccess Schem es
This group of schemes can also be called RSA-based schemes because the 
intractability of the RSA problem forms the basis of the security of the 
schemes.
3.1.1 A kl-Tay lor scheme
Akl-Taylor scheme [1] is the first scheme that addresses the access control in 
a poset hierarchy. Let Oi, Cg, - - - , O,, • • • indicate the security classes in the 
poset. The key assignment are as follows:
choose 2 large secret prime numbers p and q, and publish N  =  pq 
choose a secret g E Z» 
for each class 0% do
assign a distinct prime number pi
P  =  Ylcjf,CiPj assigned to each class as its public parameter 
ki =  mod N  is assigned to Ci as its secret key 
end for
Procedure 5: AKL-Taylor Key assignment
When a class Ci tries to derive the secret key of class Cj < Ci, it runs 
the following key derivation algorithm:
kj =  k.
Procedure 6: AKL-Taylor Key derivation 
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Table 3.1: Key Assignment in Akl-Taylor scheme
Security Class Public Parameter Secret Key
1 P = 1 h
2 P2 = P1P3P6P7P11P12
3 p5 = P1P2
4 Pi = P1P2P3P5P6P7P11P12 P = kY
5 P  = P1P2P3P4P6P7P8PIIP12
6 P  = PlP2P3P4P5P7P8?9Pl0Pl2 k& = fcf®
7 P  = PlP2P3P4P5P6?8P9PlO kj = kY
8 P  = P1P2P3P4P5P6P7P9P10P11P12 p  = kp
9 P  = P1P2P3P4P5P6P7P8P10P11P12 kg = A:f®
10 Po = P1P2P3P4P5P6P7P8P9P11P12 Po = k^°
11 Pll = P1P2P3P4P5P6P7P8P9T10P12 Pi = A:f“
12 P12 = P1P2P3P4P5P6P7P8P9P10P1I pg = kf"
The secret analysis is as follows:
I f  Cj > C j ,  then Pj\Pi, and kj =  is computable by Q  with secret
key and the public parameters p  and Pj.
I f  Cj ^  Ci, then Pj \ P , and to compute kj =  is to solve the RSA
problem, which is not feasible.
We give an example for the AKL-Taylor scheme. A  hierarchy shown 
in Figure 1.1 consists of Ci , - - -  , Cig. Suppose p i,-- -  ,pn  are the prime 
numbers assigned to the classes respectively. Then secret keys and the public 
parameters of the classes are shown in Table 3.1.
In the case Cg > Qo, if Cg is to derive the key of C\q , it  can compute
kw =  ^^10/-Pa y
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In the case C4 ^  C5 , if  C4 tries to derive p ,  i t  w ill have to solve the RSA 
problem, which is infeasible:
P  =  mod N
=  m odK
Akl-Taylor scheme is an elegant solution to the access control in a poset 
hierarchy. But with this scheme, a large amount of storage for the public 
parameters is required. For example, in a system with n classes, a leaf 
class (a class without any successor) needs to store the product of n distinct 
prime numbers. Moreover, once a security class is added to or deleted from 
the system, the public parameters and keys of all the classes except for its 
predecessors have to be re-calculated.
Later, in [14], Alackinnon et al. presented an algorithm for prime as­
signment for Akl-Taylor scheme. W ith  the improved assignment, the primes 
assigned to the classes do not have to be distinct as in the original Akl-Taylor 
scheme. This reduces the number of distinct primes in Akl-Taylor scheme, 
but the number of primes used in a class’s public parameter is s till the same 
as in Akl-Taylor scheme.
3.1.2 H arn -L in  scheme
In [10], Earn and Lin proposed an scheme that can be viewed as a “mirror 
version” of the Akl-Taylor scheme, which shifts the storage load from the 
lower classes to the upper classes. The key assignment procedure is shown 
in Procedure 7.
I f  a class Ci tries to derive the secret key of class Cj, it runs the key 
derivation algorithm in Procedure 8 .
The correctness Harn-Lin key assignment and derivation can be verified 
as follows:
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CA choose 2 large secret prime numbers p and q, and publish N  =  pq 
CA choose a public a e [2, n — 1] such that gcd{a, A ) =  1 
for each class C, do
assign a distinct prime number Cj 
compute di — mod (f>{N) 
end for
for each class Q  do
CA computer R  =  ric^<Ci R 
CA assign R  to each class as its public parameter 
CA compute ki =  mod N
CA assign ki to Q  as its secret key 
end for
Procedure 7: Harn-Lin Key assignment
Procedure 8: Harn-Lin Key derivation
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Notice that eAi =  1 mod 4>{N)
=  (onc;,<c/k m od^M ^nc,<c,W nc,<c/* mod A
=  (anc;,<Cj mod ^
=  kj
The security of the Harn-Lin scheme is analyzed as follows:
I f  Ci > Cj, R IP , then kj =  is computable by C« w ith  secret key
and the public parameters p  and p .
I f  Cj j t  Ci, then R  { p ,  and to compute K j  =  K ^^^ ' is to solve the RSA 
problem, which is not feasible. □
Also, we give an example of Harn-Lin scheme. Like the example for the 
AKL-Taylor scheme, hierarchy shown in Figure 1.1 consists of C i, • • • , Cig. 
Suppose pi, • • • ,p i2 are the prime numbers assigned to the classes respec­
tively. Then secret keys and the public parameters of the classes are listed 
in Table 3.2
In the case Cg > Cio, if  Cg is to derive the key of Cio , i t  can compute 
kio =  mod A
In the case C 4  ^  C 5 , if  C 4  tries to derive R , it  w ill have to solve the RSA 
problem, which is infeasible:
ks =  mod A
=  mod A
W ith the Harn-Lin scheme, the higher a class is in the hierarchy, the 
larger storage it requires. In a hierarchy w ith n classes, the leaf classes 
need to store only 1 prime as its public parameter, but a root class (a class 
that is the predecessor of all other classes) needs to store the product of n
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T a b le  3 .2 ; K e y  a s s ig n m e n t  in  H a r n - L i n  s c h e m e
S e c u r i t y  C la s s P u b l ic  P a r a m e t e r S e c r e t  K e y
1 P i  —  616263646566676869610611612 =  o W  mod j
2 P 2  —  6264656369610 =  o A '  mod jY
3 P 3  —  636466676369610611612 Ala =  0 ^ ^ '  mod A
4 P i  =  646369610 Al4 =  mod ^(IV) j  ^
5 P 5  =  6569610 Alg =  mod ÿ (N )  j  2Y
6 P q =  65611 Ale =  m o d ^ (N ) jY
7 P 7  =  67611612 k j --- aO  ̂ 'I’P l  m o d  N
8 P s  =  6g k s  =  aK   ̂ mod 4>{N) j \ j
9 P 9  =  69 Aig =  mod A
10 P ig  =  610 Alio =  0^1^' m o d ^ M  yy
11 P l l  =  611 A iii m odÿ(W ) ;Y
12 P12 =  612 k i 2 =  aCY mod 4>{N) jyf
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primes. This is reverse to the Akl-Taylor scheme. Considering there are more 
lower classes than upper classes in a practical hierarchy, the Harn-Lin scheme 
achieves improvement in storage space consumed by all users. However, in 
view of the greatest storage space required for a single user, the Harn-Lin 
scheme is the same as the Akl-Taylor scheme.
3.1.3 Huang-Yang Scheme
In [11], Huang and Yang proposed a scheme based on Akl-Taylor scheme 
to reduce the number of primes consumed in Akl-Taylor scheme. In Akl- 
Taylor scheme, each class is assigned with a distinct prime. In Huang-Yang 
scheme, a combination of primes is assigned to a class. For example, it assigns 
( 2°) — 45 pairs of primes to 45 classes, instead of assigning 10 distinct primes 
to 10 classes respectively. By reducing the number of primes, it  is hoped that 
the storage space for the key materials for a class will be reduced.
The key assignment in Huang-Yang scheme is shown in Procedure 9. In 
the procedure, /  is a one-way hash function.
I f  a class Cj tries to derive the secret key of class C j , it runs the following 
key derivation algorithm as shown in Procedure 10.
Although the scheme is carefully designed w ith several attacking possibil­
ity  in mind, [2 1 ] shows that it  is insecure against the collusion attack whereby 
some security classes conspire to derive the secret keys of other leaf security 
classes. Here we show that some leaf security classes in a leaf group can 
conspire to derive secrets of other classes in the same leaf group.
Assume the leaf group {Cj_i, Cj_2 , - , Cj_j} w ith secret keys {fcj_i, &j_2, • • ■ ,
fcj t̂}, respectively, has a common ancestor C j .  W ithout loss of generality, we 
assume that {Q q , Qq, • • • , Q q_ i} collude.
Denote L =  km (L jq , Rq, • • • , Rq). We can represent Kj_j as follows. For
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choose 2 large secret prime numbers p and q, and publish N  — pq 
choose a public /cq G [2, n -  1] such that gcd{ko, n) =  1 
for each class Q  do
if Ci is not a leaf class then  
assign a distinct prime number 
compute di =  e~  ̂ mod <̂ (7V) 
else
assign a distinct set of prime number Zj =  • • • , 6  ̂^}
compute z' =  • ■ • , where d ij  =  eC mod 0(iV), j  G [1, k]
end if 
end for
for each class Q  do
if Ci is not a leaf class then
computer Pj, the product of the distinct primes assigned to Cj where
Q  <  Q
CA assign p  to Q  as its public parameter 
compute ki =   ̂ mod N
assign ki to C, as its secret key 
else
computer P  =  f j  
assign p  to each class as its public parameter
CiCP-Ud.ez'C'j mod 4,{N)
compute ki =  k()  ̂ ' mod N
assign ki to C, as its secret key
end if 
end for
Procedure 9: Huang-Yang Key assignment
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p (  mod N  if  Ci is a leaf class,
[  mod N  if  Q  is a leaf class,
Procedure 10: Huang-Yang Key derivation
I e
mod AT =  mod TV
where A:'- =  kp^^.
By extended Euclidean algorithm, we can find t — 1 integers for I e 
[ l , t  — 1], such that
y i  - ^ f { C i , i ) v i , i= A
te(i,t-i]
where
A = gcd(-^/(C',,/) 1])
R,i
Then we have
n  =  n  mod #  =  (K :;y  mod Y
1] 1]
I f  A|(p, i f l d t p i tb^n Q ,i, Ci,2 , • • • ,, Ci^t-i can conspire to deduce ki t̂ as fol­
lows:





The research in [21] shows that the probability of A|(p. is rather
high. For example, in a leaf group of 10 members, each assigned with 2 primes 
out of 5 primes. I f  the output length of /  is 48 bit, then the probability that 
a class can be attacked by others is greater that 90%.
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3.2 Som e In d irect A ccess Schem es
3.2.1 Sandhu Scheme
In [18], Sandhu proposed an access control scheme for tree hierarchy based 
on parameterized family of one-way functions constructed from encryption 
primitives such as DES. The tree hierarchy is a special case of a poset hier­
archy where each class has at most one immediate predecessor. The key for 
a class is generated w ith its identity (ID) and the key of its immediate pre­
decessor through a one-way function. In the scheme, no public parameters 
are needed for key derivation except for the ID of the classes.
A well known method to construct a one-way function is to encrypt some 
fixed and public known constant c using x as the key, i.e. f {x )  =  P (c) where 
£ is the encryption algorithm of a block cipher. This can be generalized 
to obtain a family of one-way functions by replacing the constant c by a 
parameter p, that is fp{x) =  £x{p)- Now computing the inverse of fp{x) 
amounts to computing the key x given that p encrypted as f{x ) .  So this is a 
known plaintext attack which is infeasible for secure cryptosystems. Hence 
fp{x) is a one-way function for every p. The collection of functions fp{x) is 
called a parameterized family of one-way functions.
The key assignment procedure in Sandhu scheme is shown in Procedure
11.
assign an arbitrary key to the root security class, 
for each class Q  do
if Cj is an immediate successor of C, then
assign to C, as its key.
end if 
end for
Procedure 11: Sandhu key assignment procedure
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Each class Cj can derive the key of its immediate successor. I f  Q  <  Cj 
but Ci is not an immediate successor of Cj, Cj needs to run the derivation 
procedure iteratively for each Q  that Ci < Ci <  Cj and finally derives ki. 
The procedure is shown in Procedure 12. When a Cj is to derive the key of 
its successor Q , it runs the procedure in Procedure 12.
if  Ci is C /s immediate successor then  
else
Cj compute all keys in the path from Cj to Q  downwards until ki is 
obtained 
end if
Procedure 12; Sandhu key derivation procedure
Since the family of one-way functions is publicly known and the names of 
the security classes are public, a class can easily compute the key kj for all 
security classes Cj covered by Cp, However it  is computationally infeasible to 
compute kj for a security class Cj >  C,; since this amounts to the inversion 
of one or more one-way functions.
Finally it  should be computationally infeasible to compute kj from ki for 
Cj incomparable w ith Q . To see what this entails consider the simple case 
where C, and Cj are immediate successor of Ck- Then
By the assumed security of the £ it  is infeasible to compute kj from ki by 
solving the known plaintext problem of the former equation to derive k^ and 
then using the latter equation to compute kj. For a strong cryptosystem we 
believe it can be safely assumed that there w ill also be no other tractable 
method of computing kj from ki in this situation. Moreover even if we know
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the keys for a large number of siblings it  w ill be infeasible to compute the 
keys for a sibling outside the known set. That is collusion among the siblings 
is infeasible. Similar considerations apply to incomparable classes which are 
not siblings.
Compared with the direct access schemes, the required storage space in 
Sandhu scheme is reduced tremendously. However, this scheme can only be 
implemented for a tree hierarchy. The solution for the general case of an 
arbitrary poset was not given.
3.2.2 Zhong Scheme
In [24] Zhong proposed a solution that supports poset while inheriting the 
advantages of Sandhu scheme. This scheme is based on an ideal hash function 
h : TZxS 7Z where 7Z can be considered as a set of keys, 5  can be regarded 
as a set of class IDs. The hash function must be collision-free and modelled 
as a random oracle.
The key assignment procedure in Zhong’s scheme is shown in Procedure 
13P
When a class Cj > Q  needs to derive the ki, it runs the key derivation 
procedure as described in Procedure 14.
The security analysis is given as follows.
This scheme prevents classes from illegal derivation of keys. That is, a 
class can never derive a key that does not belong to any successor. In general, 
consider the class Q . Suppose that Q  wants to derive kh, where C/ ^  C / 
Therefore, Q  has to compute kh from ki. For each common predecessor Cj 
of these two security classes, these two secret parameters can be expanded
^In Zhong’s scheme, the key assigned to Q  is fci 0 P i  where Pi is picked by Q. Here 
we simplify the description.
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for each class Q  do
if Ci has no predecessor then
CA picks ki eTZ  uniformly at random 
else if Ci has one immediate processor Cj  then  
CA picks ü j j  e S
ki  ̂ h(^kj, cijj'  ̂
publish ü j j  
else
{comment: Q  has more than one immediate predecessors
C ji, • • • , Cjk }
CA picks Qjij, ■ • ■ , djk,i G <S
ki  ̂ h{kj\, d jij^
Oj2,i ^  A;j 0  h{kj2,aj2,i)
Ojk,i ^  A:; 0  h{kj2,aj2,i) 
publish d ji j ,  ' ' ' , ^jk,i 
publish O j 2j ,  ■■■ , Ojk,i 
end if 
end for
Procedure 13: Zhong key assignment procedure
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if  Cj is the single immediate predecessor of Q  then
ki — hk j , dj i
else if Cj is Q 's immediate predecessor Cj\ then
ki ■< h(^kji,djij^
else if Cj is C /s immediate predecessor Cjp,p >  1 then
ki =  Ojpj 0
else
Cj compute all keys in the path from Cj to C, downwards until ki is 
obtained 
end if
Procedure 14: Zhong key derivation
according to the paths from Cj  to them:
ki =  h ( . .. h{kj, 
kh — . ..hi^kj,
However, by the property of random oracle, h{L, a) is independent of h{L, a') 
if a /  d'. Because Ch <  Q , the paths from Cj to C/, must diverge from the 
path from Cj  to Q  at some point. Therefore, kh must be independent of ki. 
In other words, Q  cannot compute kh from fcj. □
3.2.3 Zheng-H ard jono-P ieprzyk Scheme
In [23] Zheng et al. proposed a solution that supports poset while inheriting 
the advantages of Sandhu scheme. What is more important, in this proposal, 
the security of the scheme is analyzed based on a comprehensive security 
model instead of some ad hoc attacking scenarios. The security definition is 
as follows:
Definition 3.1 Let C  be the set of classes in a hierarchical organization. 
S' C  C , 8 (S') denotes the set of classes in S' and all the successors of S'.
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Let P  be a polynomial, I an integer. Assume |C| =  P{n). A key generation 
scheme fo r a hierarchical organization is secure i f  for any S' C C, fo r any 
class Ci ^  0(§O, fo r any polynomial Q and fo r all sujficiently large I, the 
probability that the classes in S' are able to find by collaboration the key ki 
of the class Q  whenever Q  has no successor, or to simulate C« ’s procedure 
fo r generating the key of a successor of Q  whenever Q  is an internal class 
or the root class, is less than .
Pseudorandom function families and sibling intractable function fami­
lies (SIFF) are employed in this scheme. fc-SIFF is a generalization of the 
universal one-way hash function family we have introduced. Similar to the 
universal one-way hash function, the k-SIFF has the following properties:
1. let s =  [log2 (fc)], k-SIFF maps {0 ,1 } ' to {0,1}*“ ®
2. Given distinct Xi,--- ,Xj G { 0 , 1 } / j  < k, it  is easy to find f  e k — 
S IF F  such that f { x i )  =  f { x 2 ) =  • ■ ■ =  f {x j) .
3. Given distinct Xi, ■ • • ,Xj G { 0 , 1 } / j  < k, and the f  e k — S IF F  such 
that / ( x i)  =  /(xa) =  • • • =  f { x j ) ,  it  is infeasible to find a x' such that
=  /(Xg) =  . . . =  /(X j).
We define the notes for the key assignment and derivation procedures. 
Denote by 7Dj the identity of the class C, . Assume that every 7D, can 
be described by an m{l)-hit string, where m is a polynomial. Let T  — 
{T i}  be a pseudo-random function family, where T) =  { f x l fK  ■ {0, l } ” *̂h 
{0 ,1 } / K  G {0 ,1 }" }  and each function fK  G IFi is specified by an /-b it string 
K.  Let FI =  [J iH i he a. /c-SIFF mapping /-bit to /-bit output strings. Also 
assume that k is sufficiently large so that no nodes could have more than k 
parents. The key assignment procedure is described in Procedure 15.
When a class Cj >  Q  needs to derive the F, it runs the key derivation 
procedure as described in Procedure 16.
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A random string ko G {0,1}^ is chosen for the root class 
for each class Q  without a key do
if the class Q  has a single immediate predecessor Cj then  
ki =  îkj{kF>i) 
else
{comment; Q  has p immediate predecessors C^y, , • • •
a random ki G {0 ,1 }' is chosen for C, 
choose from H; a function hi such that 




Procedure 15: Zheng-Hardjono-Pieprzyk key assignment
if Cj is the single immediate predecessor of Q  then  
h  =  fk j{ ID i)
else if Cj is one of the immediate predecessors of Q  then  
ki =  h i{fk^{ID i)) 
else
Compute all keys in the path from Cj to Q  downwards until ki is ob­
tained 
end if
Procedure 16: Zheng-Hardjono-Pieprzyk key derivation
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For the security of the scheme, [23] gives a proof sketch as follows:
Assume S' C C, Cj ^  ©(S'). According to the definition for security, the 
following two cases are to be considered:
Case 1 : Q  has no successor and S' can directly find the key of C, .
Case 2 : Q  has one or more successors and S' can simulate C i ’s procedure for 
generating the key kj of some successor Cj of Q.
First discuss Case 1 where C, has no successor. Note that the key ki of 
Ci is derived from the key(s) of the predecessor (s) of Cj by the use of the 
pseudo-random function family. Therefore, obtaining ki by S' implies that S' 
is able to predict the output of the pseudo-random function family, which is 
a contradiction.
Now consider Case 2 where Q  is an internal class or the root class, and 
S' can simulate Q  ’s procedure for generating the key kj of some successor 
Cj of Ci . Note that Cj may or may not be a member of 0 (5 '). For the key 
generation scheme, being able to simulate C j ’s procedure for generating the 
key Cj of the successor Cj of Cj implies being able to get either ki when C, 
is the single predecessor of Cj , or fk^ (ID j) when Cj has other predecessor 
than Cj . Also note that getting ki or fk ^ ilD j)  means getting the keys of 
all the descendants of Cj besides the key kj of Cj . Thus there are only two 
situations to be considered when S' is able to get fcj or fk^{ID j) but fails to 
mimic any of the immediate predecessors of Cj . These two situations are:
Situation 1 : Cj is an predecessor of some class(s) in 0(S').
Situation 2 : Cj is not the predecessor of any class in ©(S').
Consider Situation 1 first. Since Q  is an predecessor of a class in ©(S'), there 
is a path from Cj to the class in ©(S'). Cj can derive the key of the class 
in ©(S') by evaluating the pseudo-random function family and (instances of)
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the sibling intractable function family which appear in the path. Therefore, 
getting the key fcj of Q  or / fc //D j)  by S' implies that S' can do at least 
one of the following three actions: invert the pseudo-random function family, 
find a collision string for (instances of) the sibling intractable function family 
(appearing in the path from C, to the class in ©(S'), or invert (instances of) 
the sibling intractable function family. The success of any of these actions 
w ith a high probability is a contradiction. Comparing to Situation 1, Situ­
ation 2 is easier to analyze. Since Q  is not the predecessor of any class in 
©(S'), there is pass from a class in ©(S') to Q  . Thus getting fcj or / fc / /D j)  
by ©(S') implies that ©(S') can predict the output of the pseudo-random 
function family. This is also a contradiction.
The construction of fc-SIFF is similar to the construction of universal one­
way hash function we presented in section 2.4.3. An example is as follows.
Let s >2^. On the finite field F 2 m,
=  {pa,b|go,b(:c) =  cL o p(ao  4 - O iX  -I 1- Oo, ' "  , « k - i  G 7 ^ ^ .}
where all computation are in Egm and the function
c/iop : { 0 , i r  { 0 ,
chops the last s bits.
Let /  be an one-way permutation. Define Hm =  {h  =  g o f\g  E Gm)}- 
Then Um(^m) is a k-universal one-way hash function.
[12] and [24] state that there are problems in implementation of Zheng’s 
scheme in practice. But from the above example, we think the implementa­
tion is practical.
The security model in the Zheng-Hardjono-Pieprzyk scheme is actually 
equivalent to our security model in Definition 1.1. Yet a formal and rigor­
ous proof can not be obtained directly from the above proof sketch. The 
argument in the proof is more “statement” than “proof’ . Detailed proof is
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still open there. For example, we consider the following simple scenario in 
Figure 3.1. Suppose S' =  {C 2 , C4 }, the class they are going to attack is C3.
Figure 3.1: A simple attacking scenario: class 2 and class 4 conspire to attack 
class 3
This case falls into Case-2, Situation-1 in the proof sketch. According to 
the proof argument, S' has to invert the pseudo-random function family. We 
know if  Ci itself intends to attack C3 , i t  is safe to say that C4 has to invert 
the pseudo-random function family. But now with the help of C2 , it  is not 
obvious that C4 has to invert the pseudo-random function family. What we 
need to prove here, is that w ith all the information held by C2  and C4 , to 
compute kz is infeasible. The result can not be obtained directly from the 
argument in the proof sketch.
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3 .3  Sum m ary
In this chapter we reviewed some typical hierarchical access schemes. More 
schemes with variance including [5] [6] [7] [16] [22] . In view of the four re­
quirements to the schemes, Zheng-Hardjono-Pieprzyk scheme is a outstand­
ing one. The most significant part in this scheme is that it provides a security 
model that generalized all possible attack scenarios natural to the schemes. 
Also its performance in storage and dynamics is at least as good as others. 
Yet we think its security proof should be more formal and rigorous, thus is 
more persuasive and clear to be verified. For a scheme, a proof in the flavor 
the provable security, reducing some standard cryptographic primitives to 
the scheme, w ith each step firm ly based on clear reasoning, would be more 
favorable. In the next parts, we are going to present a new scheme with same 
performance and security property as Zheng-Hardjono-Pieprzyk scheme, but 
w ith more rigorous formal security proof.
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Proposed Scheme
In this chapter, we propose a new hierarchical access control scheme.
4.1 P o se t R ep resen ta tio n
First we define how the poset is represented. For a given hierarchy structure, 
its corresponding poset (C, <) can be represented by a Hasse diagram, which 
is a graph whose vertices are classes of C and the edges correspond to the < 
relation. An edge from Cj G C to C, G C is present if  Q  <  Cj and there is 
no Ck G C such that Q  < C& and Ck < Cj. I f  Q  < Cj, then Cj is drawn 
higher than C,. Because of that, the direction of the edges is not indicated 
in a Hasse diagram. Figure 1.1 shows an example of poset represented as a 
Hasse diagram.
4.2 A u x iliary  F unction
We introduce a function that w ill be used in our scheme below. Let p =  2 g + l 
where p, q are all odd primes. Let G be the subgroup of Z* of order q. We
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define a function /  ; G —> [1 , g] as follows;
{p  — x; X > q
For any x G Z*, if  x G G, then —x ^  G. So the above function is a 
bijection. I f  x is a random variable uniformly distributed on G, /(x )  is 
uniformly distributed on [l,g].
4.3  K ey  M an agem en t
The key management of the scheme consists of two procedures; the key 
assignment and the key derivation.
4.3.1 K e y  Assignment
The CA runs Procedure 17 to assign each class Q  its public parameters p,, 
h ij and a secret key fcj. The function /  in the procedure is the auxiliary 
function presented above in (4.1).
For example, the classes in Figure 1.1 w ill be assigned with the secret key 
and public parameters as shown in Table 4.1.
4.3.2 K e y  D erivation
When a class Cj needs to compute the key of one successor Q , it finds a path 
from itself to the successor in the Hasse diagram of the hierarchy. Starting 
from its immediate successor in the path, the class go through the path, and 
computes key of every successor along the path. The procedure of derivation 
is shown in Procedure 18.
For example, in Figure 1.1, class 1 is to derive the key of class 10. It finds 
the path 1 —̂ 3 10, and does the following computations:
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Table 4.1; Example of key assignment
Node I D secret key public parameters
1 k i -
2 ^  =  / ( P 2 ' ) 92
3 g 3
4 A:4 = ^4,2 — 9z f  > L4 3 =  p4^
5 k $  =  f { O s ) 95
6 ^6 =  / ( g 6^) 96
7 97
8 =  / ( g g * ) 98
9 Ag = ^9,4 =  gg^, L g ,5 — gg^
10 &10 = h i o , 3  =  9 i o ^ P h i O A  =  9 i f p h i o , 5  =  9i t ' ‘
11 k i i  = h u , 6  —  9i i i  h \ i j  =  g j f
12 ^12 =  / ( g i D g l2
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CA chooses a group Z*, where p — 2q +  1, p and q are both large primes. 
CA chooses G, the subgroup of Z* of order q
CA traverses the Hasse diagram from the root class with width-first algo­
rithm, and 
for each C* do 
set ÿi to be a unique generator of G 
if  Cj does not have any immediate predecessor then  
set ki to be a number chosen from [I, q] at random 
else if  Cj has only one immediate predecessor Cj then
else
{comment: Cj has more than one immediate predecessors} 
let X  be the set of keys of C j’s immediate predecessors
^ — rixiSA’
/Ci =  /(g f)





Procedure 17: Key Assignment
/C3 =  /(gs ')
kio =  /(^io,s)
4.3.3 A dd a class
Let Cfc be a new security class to be added into the hierarchy. The procedure 
to add the class is shown in Procedure 19.
65
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
CHAPTER 4. PROPOSED SCHEME
if Cj is the only one immediate predecessor of Q  then  
else if Cj is one of immediate predecessors of Q  then
ki — 
else
{comment: Cj is not a immediate predecessor of Q }  
compute all keys in the path from Cj to Q  downwards until p  is obtained 
end if
Procedure 18: Key Derivation
Exam ple 4.1 Let class C\z be the new class to be added in the hierarchy, 
serving as the immediate predecessor of C i and immediate successor of C i, 
as shown in Figure f . l .  After the update, key of Ci is set, and the keys and 
public parameters of the classes that are successors of Cis, including C i, Cg, 
Cg and Cio, are updated.
4.3.4 Delete a classe
Let Ck be the class to be deleted from into the hierarchy. The procedure to 
delete the class is shown in Procedure 20.
Exam ple 4.2 Let class Cg be the class to be deleted from the hierarchy, as 
shown in Figure f.2. After the update, the keys and the public parameters of 
Cg and Cio are changed.
4.3.5 A dd relation
A relationship between Ca and Q  added to the hierarchy so that Ca >  C& is 
added. The procedure to add the relation is shown in Procedure 21.
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CA randomly selects e G / { 1 }  for Cj 
if Ci does not have any immediate predecessor then  
set ki to be a number chosen from [1 , q] at random 
else if Ci has only one immediate predecessor Cj then
^  =  /(g ^ )  
else
{comment; Q  has more than one immediate predecessors} 
let X  be the set of keys of C/s immediate predecessors
^ — rixiGA’
=  /(g f)
for all Xj  G A do
end for 
end if
for all Ci that is the successor of Ck do
if Ci has only one immediate predecessor Cj then  
=  /(g ^ )
else
{comment: Q  has more than one immediate predecessors} 
let X  be the set of keys of C/s immediate predecessors
^ =  rix
=  /(g j 
for all Xj  G A do
7





Procedure 19: Add a new class
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Figure 4.1: Add a class: class 13 is added.
Exam ple 4.3 Let edge from  Cg to Cg is added to the hierarchy, as shown in 
Figure f.S). After the update, the keys and the public parameters of Cq, C\i 
are changed.
4.3.6 D elete relation
A relationship between Ca and Cb is delete from the hierarchy so that Ca >  C& 
is deleted. The procedure to delete the relation is shown in Procedure 22.
Exam ple 4.4 Let edge from  C3 to C4 is deleted from the hierarchy, as shown 
in Figure f-4- After the update, the keys and the public parameters of Ci, 
Cg, Cg ond Cio changed.
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Traverse the classes of Cfc’s successors with width-first algorithm, and 
for each C, that is Cfc’s successor do
if Ci is an immediate successor of Cfc then  
CA assigns a new generator g, to Q  
end if
if  Ci does not have any immediate predecessor other than Cfc then  
set ki to be a number chosen from [1 , q] at random 
else if Ci has only one immediate predecessor Cj other than Ck then
^  =  /(9 ^ )  
else
{comment; Q  has more than one immediate predecessors other than 
Cfc}
let X  be the set of keys of C,’s immediate predecessors (not include 
Cfc)
^ “  Yixi&X 
=  /(g f)  
for all Xj G A do




Delete Cfc and and the edges connected to Cfc
Procedure 20: Delete a class
69
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
CHAPTER 4. PROPOSED SCHEME
Figure 4.2: Delete a class: class 5 is deleted.
Figure 4.3: Add a relation: class 2 > class 6 is added.
70
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Add an edge for the new raltion
Traverse the sub-graph consists of the class Q  and its successors with 
width-first algorithm, and 
for each Q  traversed do
if Ci has only one immediate predecessor Cj then  
=  /(g ^ )
else
{comment: Q  has more than one immediate predecessors} 
let X  be the set of keys of C /s immediate predecessors
^ =  U  
=  /(g f)
for all Xi E X  do




Procedure 21: Add a relation
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the CA assigns Q  with a new generator
Traverse the sub-graph consists of the class Cb and its successors with 
width-first algorithm, and run the following algorithm for each class: 
if Ci has only one immediate predecessor Cj then  
=  /(9 ^ )
else
{comment: Q  has more than one immediate predecessors} 
let X  be the set of keys of Q 's immediate predecessors
— T\.x (̂3X
A:i =  /(p f)
for all Xj  e  A do
h i, =  s C
end for 
end if
Delete the edge for the relation
Procedure 22: Delete a relation
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11 12
Figure 4.4; Delete a relation: class 3 >  class 4 is deleted.
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4 .4  S ecu rity  A n a lysis
4.4.1 Standard Cryptographic Assumptions
On the group G used in our scheme, two standard assumptions, the discrete 
logarithm (DL) assumption and decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDK) assumption 
are believed to hold [3]. Another assumption, named group decisional Difhe- 
Hellman (GDDH) assumption is proved to hold on G too [20, 4]. To be 
concrete, let g be a generater of G, a,b,c be random variables uniform on 
[l,g ], A  be a set of random variables uniform on [l,g ], I be the binary 
length of q. Suppose \X\ is polynomially bounded by I. Let (S') indicate 
the product of all elements in the set S. For any probabilistic polynomial 
time (in Ï) algorithms A, any polynomial Q, for I large enough, the three 
assumptions are formally expressed as follows;
DL assumption:
Pr[Aig,g°‘) =  a] <
<2(0
DDE assumption:
ln W 9 .9 “ ,9‘ .s “‘ ) =  1] -  P ,W 9 .9 “ ,9‘ ,V )  =  111 <  o y j
For convenience, we use the notation from [20] to simplify the expres­
sion. We say that the probabilistic distributions {g, g°', g^, g°'̂ ) and 
{g, g°', g^, g^) are polynomially indistinguishable, and denote them as
W, g",
GDDH assumption:
c  %) =  i] -A [A (g ,p ^ p n (s ) |^  c  %) =  i]| < ^
or denoted as
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4.4.2 Security P roof
The security of our scheme is based on the above three assumptions. In 
the following parts, we prove the scheme is secure under Definition 1.1. We 
suppose the number of classes in C is polynomially bounded by I (the binary 
length of |G|), and all the algorithms considered below are polynomial time 
(in I) algorithms.
We choose an arbitrary class Q  E C and suppose its secret key is kt- Let 
A be the set of predecessors of Q . We need to prove that, even when all the 
classes in C — A — { Q }  conspire, it  is computationally intractable for them 
to derive kt.
We group the set C — A — { Q }  into three subsets; B the set of classes in 
C — A which do not have predecessors in C — A, and which is not Q ; D the 
set of classes that are immediate successors of Q; R =  C —A — {C t} — B — D. 
The followings relations between B, D and R are direct from their definitions;
•  B U © U R  =  C — A — {C t}
•  B n D  =  0, R n B  — 0 and R n D =  0
• the classes in R are successors of the classes in B, or D, or both
An example of the above partition is as follows; in Figure 3.1, suppose class 
4 is the one we choose as the class Q , then A  =  {1 ,2 ,3 },B  =  {5,6 ,7},© =  
{ 8 , 9 , 1 0 } , R  =  { 1 1 , 1 2 } .
First we consider when all classes in B conspire, what information about 
kt they can learn. Suppose the generator assigned to class Ct is %, X  is the 
set of secret keys of the immediate predecessors of class Q . Let n ( ‘5) be 
the product of all elements in the set S. Let x =  then kt =  gf- The
public parameters of Q  are
75
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The classes ^  € B with generators G [l,n ] may share the same pre­
decessors w ith class Q , thus may hold a subset of Ç T }  as their
public parameters or secret keys. We assume that
is all the information possibly held by classes in B that is related to kt. So 
the public parameters of Ct, plus the information pertaining to kt held by B 
is a subset of
We have the following result showing that even all classes in B conspire, with 
the above information, they can not distinguish kt from a random number on 
[l,q \. For convenient expression, the following theorem and its proof follow 
the notation style similar to that in [2 0 ].
Theorem  4.5 Suppose DDH and GDDH assumptions hold on the group G. 
Let c he a random variable uniform on [1 , g], x =  P%(T). The two distribu­
tions
VL = (pr, c %}, G G [1,/ ]̂})
and
K. = c x}, c x j e  |i,nl})
are indistinguishable.
P roof. From GDDH assumption we have
c  % }) c  % })
A polynomial time algorithm can choose z uniformly from [1, g] at random, 
and reduce the above GDDH distribution pair to
Vi = c (%')',(onnvvia c x]
76
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
CEAPTER 4. PROPOSED SOREME
V L  =  (ft“ . { f t .  C X},g l ,  {gîY, {(ft')n(®)|S c  X } )
respectively. It follows that
H  ^ p o l y  ( 4 -2)
Let Cl be a random variable uniform on [l,g ]. Since zci is independent of z 
and c, from DDH, we have
(gt, , g D  -M v  (po 9^, p ro
A polynomial time (in I) algorithm can choose X  that is a set of random 
variables uniform on [1 , g], and whose order is polynomially bounded by I,
and reduce the above DDH distribution pair to
VL  =  (« {.{ft.sP '^ ’ ls  C A -}.s r,(ft ') ',{(9 n n '* ’ ls  c  X } )
U t  =  ( f t ' , ( f t . C  n f t ' , ( 9 ' ) » . c  i f } )  
respectively. I t  follows that
C  C  (4.3)
Similarly, by choosing z and c uniformly from [1, g] at random, a polynomial
time (in I) algorithm can reduce the GDDH distribution pair
c  % }) c  % } ) .
to
VL  =  (9{,{9.,9P '“ ’ |S c  A i} . f t '. ( f t ')« ,{ ( f t ')n ra |s c  A-})
K  = (ft', (ft,9P ‘^ '|s  c  x } , g t , L ; r .  {(9{)n'''>|S C X } )  .
respectively. It  follows that
^ p o l y  H  ( 4 -4 )
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From (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4), We conclude
W '^poly
I.e.,
(9 f.{ f t ,9 P '^ 'iS  c A -},9 f , { ( 9 f )n ra |S C A})
«M y {sY  S A-},ft', {Onn'i^’lS c A}) .
By choosing Zj, i G [l,n ] uniformly from [l,g ] at random, a polynomial 
time algorithm can reduce Vb and to
9 l C A},{ft“ ,{ft“-)n(''>is c A, » e  [1,4}) 
ft', { f t ,s P ‘^’ l5  c A, {4",(ft"')n'»i|g Ç A,i e [1,4})
I t  follows that
^poly ^bn
This completes our proof. □
Then we consider when the classes in B and D conspire, what information 
about kt they can learn. The classes d* G © assigned with generator 
i G [1, m] may hold a subset of the following information pertaining to kt'.
The following theorem shows that even all classes in B and © conspire, they 
can not derive kf.
Theorem  4.6 I t  is intractable fo r any polynomial time (in I) algorithm to 
derive gf from
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i.e., fo r any polynomial time (in I) algorithm A, any polynomial Q, i f  I is 
sufficiently large, then
1
=  W ) ] <
(2 (f) '
Proof. For convenience, let
Step 1. Assume that there exist a polynomial time (in I) algorithm B,  
a polynomial Qi and a number L, for I > L
Pr lB(V,  g 'J’ P ) =  f i g f ) ]  >  ^  (4.5)
where gd is a generator of G.
Let c be a random variable uniform on [l,g], Q2{1) =  2Q i(l). Suppose I 
is large enough. We consider the following two cases
*  Case 1: =  /(g f)] >
Notice that c is a random variable independent of V. Let z G [l,g], we 
define the following algorithm C{gd,
choose a generator of G as g*
choose a set of n distinct generators of G as B
choose a set of random variables uniform on [1 , q] as A
compute V with gt, B and A
return B(P, g^, g^)
A lgorithm  23: C{gd,gl )
The algorithm C is a polynomial time (in I) algorithm. Since z =  /(g. 
for some c G [1, g] (though we do not know c), we have
Q Ll)
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This contradicts the DL assumption. 
Case 2:
From this inequality and (4.5), we have
a i B U . f t . d " ' ' )  =  / ( f t ' ) l  -  a |B (v ,9 j,9 } '» o  =  / ( 4 ) i  
1 1
1
J(9D\ _  ff„c\
>
(?2(Z)
Let z e G, we define the algorithm D(V, z) in Algorithm 24.
(4.6)
choose a generator of G as g& 





A lgorithm  24: D(V, z)
D is a polynomial time (in I) algorithm. From (4.6), we have
P4D (V ,9 f) =  l l - P . p ( V , g a  =  l l
=  P , [ B ( V ,  f t ,  f tV W ' )  =  f i g ; ) ]  -  P r l B i V ,  f t ,  g P V V ) =  f { g ; ) ]  
1
>
(2 2 (f) '
That means D can distinguish the two distributions:
(P ,gr) (V.Pt).
This contradicts to Theorem 4.5.
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Combining Case 1 and Case 2, we conclude that for any polynomial time (in 
I) algorithm B, any polynomial Q, for sufficiently large I,
1
Pr B(V,g,,gd  = /O f) < (4.7)
Step 2 . Assume there exist a polynomial time (in I) algorithm A , a 




Let H (V ,gd,gf^'^) =  A(V,{g^,gy^^'^|% E [1,/".]}) where zi, -- are
random variables uniform on [1, g], and m is polynomially bounded by I. We 
have
Pr B(V,ft.9i'“̂ >) = /{9f)] = P r [ A ( V , { g ‘i , ( g ÿ ) ’ '-’ V ' \ i e [ \ M )  =  S i f , ) ]
1>
(2 (f)
This contradicts (4.7). Therefore for any polynomial time (in I) algorithm 






□This completes our proof.
Finally, we consider when all the classes in B, D, and R conspire, whether 
they are able to derive kp. Since all the classes in R are successors of B or 
D or both, the information held by R can be derived by a polynomial time 
(in I) algorithm from the information held by B and B. Thus if  B U D U R 
can derive kp, then B U D can derive kp. This contradicts to Theorem (4.6). 
Therefore we conclude that the scheme is secure under the security model 
defined in Definition (1.1).
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Summary
In this chapter, we briefly summarize the schemes we have reviewed and 
proposed. We set four criteria to evaluate the schemes. Because all these 
schemes except for Sandhu’s scheme [18] support poset structure, we only 
compare these schemes in the other three criteria, i.e., storage requirement, 
dynamics and security.
5.1 S torage R eq u irem en t
Our scheme is an indirect access scheme, and has similar storage requirement 
with other indirect schemes. In a hierarchy with N  classes where each class 
has at most M  predecessors, the storage space required for a single class is 
about M  for our scheme and other indirect schemes. For the direct schemes, 
to store the public information of one class, the maximum storage is about 
N  numbers, or the product of the N  numbers. In a real situation, N  would 
be much greater than M , and N  w ill increase as the scale of the hierarchy 
increases, while M  usually keeps constant. So the indirect schemes achieves 
require less storage than the direct schemes.
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5.2 D yn am ics
As an indirect hierarchical access scheme, the operation of adding, deleting a 
class or link in our scheme is similar to other indirect access schemes. When 
a class is added or deleted, or a link is added to or deleted from a class, 
only its successors are impacted, i.e., the secret key and public parameters 
of those classes need to be updated. The direct schemes are quite different. 
For example, in Akl-Taylor scheme, when a class is added or deleted, all the 
classes except for its successors have to update their secret keys and public 
parameters. In Harn-Lin scheme, when a class is added or deleted, all its 
predecessors w ill be impacted. In addition, for these two schemes, to prevent 
a deleted class to access its former successors, the keys of these successors 
have to be changed too. In a practical hierarchy, there are much more low 
level classes than high level classes, and it  is more likely that the low level 
classes will change. Therefore in an indirect scheme, less classes are impacted 
than in a direct scheme when the hierarchy structure changes. The indirect 
schemes are more suitable than direct schemes for a dynamic hierarchy.
5.3 S ecu rity
Security is essential to a cryptographic scheme. The hierarchical access con­
tro l schemes must withstand the cryptographic attacks. Every scheme shows 
that a class Q  cannot derive the key of another class Cj i f  Q  is not C/s  
predecessor. Some of the schemes further analyzed that in some collusion at­
tacks, the schemes are still secure. In these scheme a list of collusion attack­
ing scenarios are listed and discussed. However, such lists do not elaborate 
all possible attacks. The first comprehensive security model is presented in 
Zheng-Hardjono-Pieprzyk scheme [23]. This security model covers all possi­
ble collusion attacks. In their scheme, Zheng et al. gave a proof sketch to
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show that their scheme is secure under this security model. However, the 
proof sketch is not a very rigorous mathematic proof. Some statement in the 
sketch is not obviously tenable and need more detailed proof to make it per­
suasive. In our scheme, we take the provable security approach, and strictly 
proved that our scheme is secure as long as the standard DDH assumption 
holds. We would say so far our scheme is the flrst hierarchical access control 
scheme that is provable security under the comprehensive security model. 
Also the techniques used in the security proof in our scheme are helpful in 
analyzing the security of other schemes.
5.4 C onclu sion
In this thesis we reviewed previous hierarchical access control schemes, pro­
posed a new access control scheme for poset hierarchy. The new scheme sup­
ports any arbitrary poset, achieves the best performance of previous schemes, 
and provides a formal security proof under a comprehensive security model. 
None of the previous schemes achieved the properties as fully as ours does. 
Also our work provides useful techniques that facilitate the analysis of other 
schemes.
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